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Žrtve kriminaliteta i rata: međunarodni i domaći kontekst
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T
his paper explores the idea of victimhood from the individual to societal level within 
the context of transitional justice and reconciliation. The idea of justice and truth has 
gained considerable prevalence within post-war states in the Balkan region. The reform of 
the state has required the regeneration of society based on particular legal interpretations 
of the political violence. As a result, an era of judicial obligations has come to frame 
how society regenerates, reforms and rehabilitates. Therefore the paper discusses the 
consequences of wartime victimization in terms of local responses to how ‘the past is 
processed’ through Transitional Justice institutions like the International Criminal Tribunal 
of Yugoslavia (ICTY), and associated ad-hoc mechanisms, like outreach programs. The 
establishment of such judicial processes have set off particular questions like can society 
be seen as victim? How is society victim? Using a socio-political approach, such questions 
are problematised through a political defeat paradigm to reveal a particular political 
anxiety that underwrites the new societies and their politics. This is where the idea of 
“state anxiety” and “political defeat” are used to discuss what has locally formed out of 
such politics of transition. 
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Introduction
Field debates regarding legal recognition, state reform, and reconciliation 
in the post war Balkan context often touched on questions like who is victim? 
Are WE (as citizens) victim, and how? In the transitional justice (TJ) context, 
the predominate understanding of who is victim has initially been written 
by  the  ICTY  court  (Orentlicher,  2010;  Banjeglav,  2011).  Since  such  legal 
conceptualisations of victims and their experience as criminal event, the social 
and political practices of local societies reposition this notion as they respond 
to the extensive changes and obligations to come from an era of dense 
reform and rehabilitation. 
Judicial obligations like hand over’s, prosecutions, and investigating crimes 
that become knotted in with European Union (EU) membership candidacy 
or other vital ‘reform projects’ (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2011: 55) have produced 
particular consequences and politics on the ground (Subotić, 2009: 362, 365). 
This is where certain social priorities involve increasing civic participation of 
formerly marginalised through accounting for the nature of the war.
In response, this paper suggests the importance of taking a closer look 
at the post-war social and political transformations undergone in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, be traced through the work of local 
NGOs. For it is the local NGOs whose informal mandate in the TJ context is to 
concentrate on social issues like victims, missing persons, human rights, and 
democracy building. These issues have come to define local NGO projects, 
initiatives, and state practices. They also frame new government dealership of 
local and international obligations, amidst the establishment of international 
transitional  justice  mechanisms  that  legally  and  structurally  address  the 
political violence of the 1990s conflicts. As such, these facets of activity require 
investigation simultaneously. The relationships between them serve as crucial 
factors to understanding what has shaped the people and the politics on the 
ground – a politics of transformation. 
Therefore, I briefly offer an account of what has emerged on the ground 
based on retrospective empirical work conducted since 2004 and ongoing. 
Fieldwork has included semi-ethnographic punctuated field visits, ranging 
from 2 months to 6 months stints at a time, respectively over the course of 
seven years. Free form discussions were chosen rather than strict interviews; 
and in some instances a short questionnaire specific to sampled NGOs was 
issued, which aided follow up correspondence. Other forms of empirical data Temida
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collation included continued field engagement with local practitioners who 
work in the non-profit sector, different government agencies, and temporary 
desks established by EU and UN programs, from each state. Research also 
included long term monitoring of NGOs and state policy ‘behaviours,’ in order 
to distinguish what are the forces behind programs. Specifically, findings are 
informed by a sample of local NGOs from each state specifically engaged with 
Reconciliation programs or projects. 
The punctuated revisit approach allowed for an extended exploration 
of the regional transition. The ‘revisit’ to the field regularly over the past 
seven years was carried out with a view to understand historical change 
and continuity, or rather the consequences of the mass political violence 
and  mass  transformation  (Burawoy,  2003:  669).  To  discuss  the  socio-
political consequences of victimization, I draw on the initiatives of six local 
organisations from each state non-comparatively, who have engaged with 
Reconciliation programs or projects, or linked to this strand of the reform field: 
Otpor (Serbia), Viktimolosko drustvo Srbija (Serbia), Civic Committee for Human 
Right GOJLP (Croatia), Documenta (Croatia), Urban Movement Mostar (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina), Udruzenje PrijedorcankiIzvor (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
By concentrating on the aforementioned local organisations we are able 
to see what has formed rather than measure the impact of the ICTY on local 
scene. Measuring the impact has proved problematic for many studies in this 
field attempting to establish direct causal links between the prosecutions 
and the people (La Rosa, 2006; McMahon, Forsythe, 2008; Meernik, 2005). I 
therefore choose to explore the work of local organisations due to their role 
in such reform and rehabilitation as repositories of the social and political 
transformation. As noted by Jonathan Hearn, local organisations become the 
voice of the people in so far as identifying wrongs, and challenging the state. 
Hearn stresses the importance with considering “civil society as part of what 
links the state to society… and as providing the channels through which peoples 
influence their state, and states cultivate legitimacy” (Hearn, 2001: 340). 
The programs and projects of local NGOs offer representation of the 
internal  social  concerns.  NGOs  focus  on  the  aforementioned  issues  and 
attempt to advocate for their address as particular social-political problems, 
which ultimately denote the local feelings of defeat. Thereby when the NGOs 
produce projects in address of such issues they project the anxieties of the 
people, but also turn them into political anxieties for the new governments to Michelle Veljanovska
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process and manage. It challenges the government, who develop responsive 
politics as riposte to these feelings. 
Society as victim – conceptual construct
The paper will discuss two particular consequences of victimization by 
focusing on the impact and role of  the ICTY  in local feelings of victimhood, 
which pits society as victim. In the past twenty years, much scholarly mite 
has gone into aptly determining international legal notion of victim and 
‘war crime.’ Though this paper does not offer a genealogy of this, it does 
recognition the innovation that has emerged with the conceptual realm 
of  how  victims  and  victimhood  is  discussed.  I  go  on  to  claim  that  the 
ICTY become a significant influence with framing an international legal 
interpretation  of  victims  regarding  the  1990s  Yugoslav  wars.  Though 
individual experiences informed the understandings, social ramifications of 
the war crimes were implicitly absorbed into the judicial perspectives. This has 
produced an uneasy theoretical terrain for discussing collective victimization 
as  mass  victimization,  and  who  comprises  such  category,  along  side 
associated questions of who does not and whether those that do not, slip into 
the perpetrator category, or perhaps even a collective of socially complicit 
citizens in the arena of transitional justice (Subotić, 2011). These questions are 
furthermore investigated at the broader level of state responsibility, where 
ideas regarding victims are lightly explored on the societal level as victims are 
locally considered in terms of comprising ‘groups’ or ‘associations.2’
In this vain, Gibney and Roxstrom explore the idea of victimhood at the 
state level, where they suggest that the impact of international tribunals tends 
to establish a ‘victimized state.’ This would pertain to the state having achieved 
an official stance on reconciliation, and how to understand the past. For Gibney 
and Roxstrom, victims should call upon their state to pressure those that 
2  Due to the magnitude of individual victims, and the handling of victims in the international 
tribunals (such as ICTY, ICTR, ICC) as quantifying a crime numerically, I claim that the social 
determination of victims is in terms of individual victims being associated or linked with 
victim  organizations  or  action  groups  where  often  victims  are  considered  in  ‘collective’ 
terms. For more on this see Vanessa Pupavac who argues this is the ‘pathologising of victims’ 
through collectivizing them stems from ‘Therapeutic governance’ (Pupavac, 2004a; 2004b). 
In agreement with Pupavac, I perceive this top-down judicial idea of victim as a form of social 
management and containment of suffering individuals in the new state. This paper will not 
further develop this but notes and acknowledges the continued need for further research in 
this area, noting that it rests predominately within agency discourse. Temida
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produced their victim identity for an apology, rather than allow for the state with 
the identified perpetrators to construct a political apology (Gibney, Roxstrom, 
2001: 935). To a certain extent, this suggests that the victims are contained in 
one state and in some instances the new state as a whole is victim. I rather 
suggest that it is society who is victim and feels victim as their relationship 
to the state is in a stage of rehabilitation and reform, and is still frayed by the 
unaddressed legacies of the past, such as the personal loss sustained and the 
consequences of broader political loss where the state in terms of political 
leadership failed. Though problematic, the victimized state frame (Gibney, 
Roxstrom, 2001) is useful for conceptually exploring victims on a broader level 
such as society as victim instead of state. This is namely due to the contextual 
nature of the Yugoslav federation where structural and social fragmentation 
produced  and  packaged  societies  into  new  sovereignties.3  This  occurred 
through the introduction of an international agenda dedicated to rehabilitating 
and reforming the new sovereignties into separate democratic states. A large 
part of the agenda concentrated on the area of justice where international neo-
liberal ideas of justice were worked into local feeling of justice.4
The first is local justice obligations and victim recognition by the new 
governments. This has seen the emergence of local legal advocacy groups 
through the need for information gathering and investigating of ICTY cases, 
which required engaging with local activists and professionals to get to the 
victims and the facts (Popović, 2008: 115). In turn, this contributed to the 
gradual growth of rights consciousness with local impetus for victim visibility 
within international judicial avenues like the ICTY. This then gave rise to 
local organizations attempting to engage with legal advocacy for victims5. 
Most commonly, local NGOs have emerged as the predominate mediums 
3  For further statist debate on state’s and apology see Gibney, Roxstrom, 2001.
4  I refer to the ‘feeling of justice’ in terms of how international justice was socially experienced. 
This does is to go beyond ‘measuring’ the impacts of the ICTY as I have found that there is 
‘disconnect’ between local links to the ICTY. As found in many socio-legal studies focusing 
on the ICTY and the reactions of society, such as La Rosa, Subotić, etc. This is further seen 
through  the  numerous  ‘outreach  programs’  established  to  by  the  UN,  as  well  as  NGOs 
who  have  developed  programs  for  assisting  witness  with  support,  and  victims  seeking 
recognition in such courts. This paper will look at one of many NGOs (later in the paper) 
working to bridge the gaps between victims and the international judicial engine that the 
ICTY has become. 
5  “Court support network project: IZVOR” – Izvor (The Source) currently involved in developing 
a network for witnesses but also to develop a court support network throughout the whole 
region. For more see: http://www.norveska.ba/ARKIV/Ongoing_Projects/IZVOR/Michelle Veljanovska
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for articulating wartime victimhood in and out of their societies (Popović, 
2008: 137). In a contracting climate, they attempt to channel citizen feelings 
of victimhood as part of their role in the TJ context. Therefore, the paper 
uses examples of legally orientated local NGOs, to focus on their role with 
contributing to state pressure through politically framed campaigns, as well 
as justice to truth seeking initiatives.
The second is connected to state international obligations. The impact 
of the ICTY establishes ‘justice’ though local group advocacy. This is where 
the era of ICTY has lead to the development of a social practice of neo-liberal 
justice and compliance. The implications are that the state functions in a 
‘responsive mode,’ causing a type of local political pressure to emerge out 
of legal reform where meeting obligations is the norm and the state governs 
with anxiety (Hage, 1996). For Jelena Subotić, such pressured induction of 
state compliance is a politics of international justice compliance where the 
state fears prosecution and domestic backlash. In response, the state develops 
particular strategies to manage such ‘pressures.’ Subotić claims that societal 
responsibility is absent in ‘the disconnect’ between prosecutions as state 
compliance. This is through how new governments manage accountability 
and responsibility at the society level – which involves ‘shielding of the 
state’ from the societal perpetrator tag. Gibney and Roxstrom also suggest 
the state is the incubator of social complicity when suggesting that victims 
should pressure their ‘state’ as the ‘victimized state’ to get an apology from 
the ‘aggressor state (Gibney, Roxstrom, 2001).’ 
These  works  demonstrate  how  the  new  states  are  drawn  into  the 
politics  of  compliance  and  local  obligations,  which  are  determined  by 
societal and judicial imaginaries of victims, responsibility, and accountability. 
Particular imaginaries are negotiated in this TJ environment. In social terms, 
responsibility and loss become more than just judicial obligation. It requires 
socially addressing layers of defeat beyond legal narrative of crime, and more 
towards the social imaginaries of the self and the lost self as victims of defeat, 
where resentment and grievance become foreboding forces of challenge 
rather than change. For instance, part of managing defeat involves dealing 
with social and political constrains in the form of social resentment and 
international policies connected to EU candidacy. Robert Meister suggests 
there to be a need for harnessing grievance where it is suppressed or lives as 
resentment. The task of the state is to manage the ambivalence and fractured Temida
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consensus where loss, suffering, and responsibility is not digestible (Meister, 
2002) and produces society as victims.
The consequences of society as victim are predominately feelings of 
‘being victims,’ which require the new state to manage those feelings as 
layers of defeat. I propose that the local effect of ‘meeting’ such local and 
international obligation has produced a politics of defeat. Defeat becomes 
something multilayered at the societal level, where local responses and 
tensions define the intra-state frictions expressed by citizens. The state is left 
with having to manage these feelings by reproducing new imaginaries.
a) Political defeat:  Personal loss vs. broader loss
Drawing  from  Ghassan  Hage’s  work  on  management  of  political 
chauvinism, which he claims is a nationalist chauvinism, parallels are found 
with post-war Balkan context in terms of how social tension impacts state and 
societal imaginaries. Through his study of Lebanon, Hage suggests ruptured 
communities struggle to deal with multilayered consequences of the past, 
producing a defeat identity. Social tensions are connected to nationalist 
animosity for the new agenda. Hage found that this shapes the new politics. 
Thereby the socially indigestible defeat identity needs to be managed and 
regenerated in terms of producing new community imaginaries:
“…the wave of ethnic and national chauvinism in ex-communist Europe from 
which emerge the contours of a much needed theory of the nature of the affective 
structure that underlies communal(1) imagining” (Hage, 1996).
This helps explore the social experience of political regimes that sustain 
‘political defeat’ of a previous regime, which in Hage’s study dealt with the 
problem of nationalistic chauvinism in Lebanon and communal relations, 
and consensus for the new order. To manage social experience of politically 
defeat, the state took efforts with shifting social feelings of defeat and loss 
that steam from the failed past regime. Hage suggests that when the new 
state is created – aspects of the old world imaginaries are left unaddressed 
causing social disharmonies and perpetuating social feelings of defeat in 
terms of a lost world and agendas (such as personal loss vs. broader loss):Michelle Veljanovska
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“The killing of Muslims because they were Muslims, especially because of 
the brutal manner in which it was done, was an anxiety driven politics aimed at 
reconstituting social reality so that the other remains a Muslim despite all and the 
Maronites’ fantasy structure was reproduced…” (Hage, 1996: 7)
Therefore, Hage’s defeat concept for how new states manage nationalist 
chauvinism is expanded in this paper so as to introduce a political defeat 
paradigm as an approach to understanding how society is victim, and shaped 
by individual anxieties, arising from personal loss, and state anxiety that 
emanates from broader loss:
“It can be argued that part and parcel of the structure is a constant anxiety – 
driven ideological work required to assure its reproduction across changing social 
and historical conditions. (Hage: 1996).”
Unlike Hage, I claim the political defeat is associated to societal feeling 
of being victim when defeated by the past and future systems. Society feels 
a constrained sense of contribution or control of that future as they are 
caught up in a politics of compliance of application. I argue that the dynamic 
socio-political tensions, to emerge from within TJ climate of change, can 
be understood through a political defeat paradigm. I use this paradigm to 
identify four types of ‘political defeat,’ to explore society as victim in the 
context of post war TJ. I propose that with the political defeat paradigm 
there is a social politics to 1) feeling defeated by leaders; 2) defeated political 
agenda; 3) feeling accountable; 4) feeling and understanding responsibility, 
which I group into a ‘political defeat paradigm.’
Layers­of­feeling­a­victim­(sense­of­defeat)­
Feeling defeated by leaders
The first sense of defeat, feeling defeated by leaders, refers to people who 
are victims of nationalist politics and the loss of socialist norms. This is where 
consensus went to the previous nationalist regime. Typically, before the 
outbreak of the 1990s armed conflict, opposition to the nationalist leadership 
and the political systems they instated was expressed through civil protest in Temida
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public squares. This is where we find early signs of resistance and the onset 
of anti-war sentiments among the general public in what is now known as 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Particular movements, and 
intellectual circles worked to campaign against corruption in the public sector, 
education, as well as other avenues used by the nationalist governments 
to mobilise propaganda:6 “In a semi-authoritarian regime such as Milošević’s 
during the 1990s, there were pockets of independent media that reported on the 
vile nature of the Serbian nationalist project and the level of atrocity committed.” 
(Subotić, 2011: 165)
After the war, and the establishment of the ICTY, the space for anti-
nationalist politics gradually opened in so far as challenging right-wing 
political leaders (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2011: 59). The prosecution of particular 
atrocities committed under the Milošević regime offered non-conforming 
local group a minor opportunity to resist the continuance of such political 
agenda. Local groups attempted to engage aspects of the population who 
did not support such regimes, and felt defeated by such leaders who carried 
out violent politics in their name. Uncomfortable with the stigmas, aspects of 
society were mobilised to call for the end of such leadership.
For instance, in Serbia, the controversial youth movement Otpor, entered 
the political scene in 20007. Their main objective was to produce campaigns, 
playing on the idea of the need to purify and remove. Efforts were made to 
prove that Serbian society not be cast as the supporters of the atrocity and 
the bestiality of the previous system8.
6  I refer to the March 1990 protest in Belgrade’s Republican square, which was the first from 
of social protest since WWII. I also refer to movements like ARC in Croatia who recently 
celebrated their 20year anniversary for the fight against nationalist politics and the war. 
Then in Bosnia Herzegovina, I make mention of Krug 99, which was an informal circle of 
intellectuals  who  secretly  meet  in  underground  radio  station  and  went  on  the  write  an 
anti-war and anti-nationalist statute, which was absorbed into reconciliation campaigns. Its 
members have become well known NVO leaders and civil society actors, continuing their 
informal allegiance to the anti-nationalist and war sentiments. 
7  Since  the  2000  Bulldozer  revolution  that  removed  Milošević  from  power,  the  group  has 
changed its function and is today involved with training activists around the world. For more 
see  http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/37103/egypt-revolution-serbia-otpor-pora-canvas-
youth.html
8  Julie  Mertus  conducted  a  ‘public  perceptions  survey’  in  parts  of  Serbia  (Novi  Sad  and 
Belgrade), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo and Banja Luka). She found that most of 
the responses from participants who resided in Serbia and considered themselves Serbian 
expressed feelings of prejudice at the ICTY. They claimed that the bias of who was tried Michelle Veljanovska
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As part of their ‘Gotov je’[He’s finished – referring to Milošević] slogans, 
Otpor developed the ‘Fleka’ [translating to Stain] advertisement where they 
played with the daily banal task of washing stains. They attempted to reveal 
how dealing with this stain is part of their everyday reality by linking it 
satirically to everyday tasks.9 In their campaign, they subversively play on 
the idea of cleansing where the ‘spokeswomen’ seems to be championing 
the best ‘formula’ for getting ridden of the toughest stains especially those 
with a 10 year severity. 
In the advertisement, she clutches a t-shirt with a picture of Slobodan 
Milošević’s face in black and white on it. She goes on to apply the ‘detergent’ 
to the t-shirt referring to the image as the stain and thrusts it into the washing 
machine, when the following commentary is made:
“For ten years I have been trying to remove this stain, believe me I have tried 
everything. Now there is a new washer that has an excellent program that reliably, 
which permanently cleans...” [She lifts the shirt from the machine flawlessly white 
and purified she says]… “and see it works...” 
The  advertisement  then  runs  with  a  voice  over  saying:  “finally he is 
finished.” The provocative segment seems to suggest that the right mix 
cleanses the stains of society, and purifies or rather vindicates those who were 
against the Milošević regime. Through its suggestive tone, the campaign 
implies that this is a collective problem not just a view harbored by a minority. 
They place the cause within a body of historical discontent reaching back to 
before the conflict broke out.
It also, to a degree, promotes an aspect of the transitional justice ideology 
of accountability and rule of law by demonizing the leader’s image and 
power. For the most part, Milošević’s party relied on hard uses of national 
broadcasting  mediums  to  communicate  pro-nationalist  propaganda.  In 
response, Otpor subverted this by creating advertisements with a satirical 
at The Hague established the stigma of Serbia as perpetrator for all the atrocities, which 
discounted victimhood of Serbians. For more see Mertus, 2007.
9  Otpor  later  went  on  to  win  an  MTV  ‘Free  Your  Mind’  award  for    their  campaigns  and 
logo  http://article.wn.com/view/2000/11/16/Yugoslav_opposition_movement_Otpor_wins_
MTV_music_a ward/. Furthermore, most of their campaigns had English subtitles – suggests 
that their audience was beyond Serbia. Temida
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tone, to serve as a mechanism for breaking10up  the  Milošević  norm  of 
nationalist atmosphere. The transitional justice ideology was translated in a 
subversive way by framing ‘advocacy’ for removing the offender (the dirty 
leader). The point they raised was that the dirty leader and their action 
implicated the nation and perennially associated them to the atrocities by 
way of representation. The campaign suggests that this has locked citizens 
into a politics of defeat, and responsibility for the suffering (individually, 
economically, and socially). This narrative of stains provides insights with 
how local tensions were harnessed, mobilized, and pulled into the broader 
building of consensus that promoted a new political system and state.
Defeated by leaders: war crimes
The other form of defeat by leaders is seen in reactions to the war criminals 
and crimes. This is where we find new states dealing with unheard victims, 
highlighted by victims associations still fighting for the support of their new 
governments. Many local victim association representatives in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina11 have projected feeling defeated by the new post-war agenda 
for governance that continues to shadow their experience. As recent as 
2011, a local government agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed for 
it to become the site of ‘fictional’ violence (by allowing war rape film to 
be shot by international film crew). The initial response of representatives 
from “Women Victims of War’ and Association of Concentration Camp Torture 
Survivors was to lobby for the permit to be revoked.12 They interpreted the 
10  Another campaign called for ‘Slobodan Milošević, save Serbia and kill yourself’ [Spasi Srbiju 
i ubij se!] Otpor put together lyics to the effect of: Spasi Srbiju i ubij se...Ti si mi rekao da 
sam izdajica...Ti si mi rekao da sam fašista i anarhista...meni si uzeo moja prava ...‘gotov je.’ 
[Translates to you told me I am a traitor... you told me I am a fascist and an anarchist... you 
took my rights... save Serbia and kill yourself...he is finished.]
  (The Stain (Fleka) - October 2000) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DAJct2qL1g&feature
=related
11  Although  I  noted  Bosnia,  I  do  acknowledge  the  grass  roots  campaigning  of  victim 
organizations throughout the region in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. Do to the limitation of 
the paper I merely select this event to project the social tension in this particular instance. In 
the past 20 years many Women’s associations have partnered up to push for awareness and 
visibility. 
12  The permit was revoked – then granted once the film production team demonstrated full 
criteria for filming according to the state standards. The film “In the Land of Blood and Honey’ 
was  produced  and  released  December  2011  in  a  seat  of  controversy.  More  information Michelle Veljanovska
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filming of such social experience as the taking of their voice and feeling 
that their government again did not shield them. Therefore, re-livening 
feelings of not being protected:
“by giving in to Hasecic, the Bosnian government essentially collectivised what 
should be individual memories of the war, which fosters a culture of collective 
victimhood to be used for ethno-national political purposes… „We can clearly 
see that politicians and clerics emerge as spokespersons for women victims, their 
stories and their rights, and that‘s what I call the political exploitation of trauma“ 
(Hopkins, 2011).
The unconsolidated nature of NGOs conveys an unconsolidated victim 
voice with regard to the experience of accountability for victims of sexual 
violence.  The  instrumentalisation  of  their  experience  has  produced  a 
particular  politics  locally  where  a  distinguishing  idea  of  victim  and  the 
discourse associated to it persists. In such an instance, the postwar issue pits 
individual victims within a complicated political vacuum where their anxieties 
regarding lack of recognition and protection in the new system, such as lack 
of status within the new order, has lead local governments down a path of 
pressure decision-making where they attempt to quell possible tensions by 
reacting to the call of a predominate victim identity. This result has left other 
victims who do not link in with organizations and associations identifying 
with the cause of war rape victims:
“they say authorities do not help them, only meting out financial assistance 
through established associations, which means as few as 2,000 women have 
registered as rape survivors. „I have yet to see any campaign where anyone 
explains how to claim status as a civilian victim of war, or rape victim. Nobody 
wants to speak about it…“ (Hopkins, 2011).
The politics between the different organizations, and the issuing of a 
permit demonstrates how the state is perennially tied to judicial obligations 
by locally being held accountable. To an extent, the significance a particular 
type of victim has had in how these issues are addressed, seems to be a 
of  this  matter  can  be  found  http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/jolie-regains-
permission-to-shoot-film-in-sarajevo/;  http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/
films/news/boos-in-berlin-for-jolies-war-drama-6792197.htmlTemida
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remaining taboo. The particular idea of war rape victim is linked in with 
a broader “victim profile,” namely referring to the ICTY interpretation of 
individuals who were targets of such violence. This is where particular legal 
idea of victim and victimhood emerges from ICTY cases and the antiquated 
application of legal principles during prosecutions.
An ICTY understanding of victim is produced through the courts and 
the cases, which is determined by the nature of (war) crime. Definitions have 
emerged from presenting legal facts accepted or outlined in the prosecutions 
to demonstrate the political nature of the crimes, and that they are victims 
of political crime. The ICTY cases have established a particular ‘international 
judicial’ notion and narrative for what it means to be victim (Stover, 2005: 5). 
Jo-Anne Wemmers and Anne-Marie de Brouwer work notes that foundations 
for identifying victims are ‘individuals as victims of crime’ when handled in 
international legal frameworks and extended to the local scene (Wemmers, 
de Brouwer, 2011: 279). The courts became the ‘frontline’ for where the 
identification and recognition of victim and their experience, which writes 
victim identity13 into a political violence narrative such as mass victimization, 
atrocity, or “systematic rape.” Socially  this victim type is established when 
transferred locally through international policy and documents issued to state 
agencies and NGOs, outlining how to deal with victims, such as TJ guides14 
for the state or when NGOs involved in Outreach programs help connect 
‘victims’ to prosecutions at the ICTY (Popović, 2008: 115). Local dealings 
with victims have been problematic, where associations still feel invisible 
(Amnesty International Report, 2009).
The political anxiety of protecting these victims has priority in the new 
politics, as demonstrated by the local governments move to revoke a permit 
once some of the more established Victims of War associations lobbied. 
Furthermore, this case also demonstrates the lack of consensus between 
victims and the associations who have risen through the TJ context. Thereby, 
depicting the deficits underwriting social concerns regarding marginalization 
based on being a victim of the past regime. This lack of consensus is a 
continued anxiety that the new government is faced with and is pressured by 
defining its local political obligations. 
13  For more see Bouris, 2007.
14  I  refer  to  a  variety  of  guides  and  manuals  developed  in  collaboration  with  local  NGO 
representatives and state officials for the different territories over the past twenty years. One 
example is Popović, 2008. Michelle Veljanovska
192
Organizational  self-interest  becomes  the  particular  consequence  of 
victimhood in so far as associations being caught in a sustainability crisis. 
Namely, as they try to sustain their existence in a context that has yet to 
recognize the full circumstances of their experience both during and after 
the war. As a result, a particular idea of victim is preserved to the detriment 
of victims who do not fit the ICTY determined victim profile, which for most 
local concerns has produced a social anxiety in terms of a limited if not absent 
local discussion on such victim experience. This suggests there continues 
to  be  a  constricted  understanding  of  war  rape  victims  through  judicial 
outcomes and prosecutions that have gone on to dimpled local political 
transformation in terms of shifting state protection parameters where they 
had failed previously. Victims continue to be streamlined or sidelined in this 
dynamic of justice as a social practice, framing how they are to be depicted 
locally not just judicially, and therein addressed by the new state government. 
As noted by Belma Becirbasic: „Victimhood is the main historical narrative that 
fuelled the ethnic conflict in the first place – you can imagine how dangerous 
the consequence can be, and that doesn‘t contribute at all to the reconciliation 
process, but on the contrary undermines it“ (Hopkins, 2011).
The failure to protect in the postwar climate is the failure to protect 
and represent. It creates a political sensitivity for the new government who 
acts when international public scrutiny arises. The victimhood discourse has 
in such an instance burgeoned the consequences as unresolved social and 
political issues, and thereby anxieties of the people that then challenge the 
new systems and the particular Hague idea of victim have come to frame. 
Elsewhere the defeat by leaders in Croatia was expressed in response 
to the new impunity laws announced in October 2011. Local NGOs, Civic 
Committee for Human Right (GOLJP) and Documenta signed protest statement15 
and staged public protests on preventing the Impunity bill on the nullity 
of certain legal acts of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) judicial bodies. 
They claimed that the law revealed the superficiality of the government’s 
compliance with international obligations like handing over former leaders. 
15  The groups went on to organize a round table in Zagreb, March 2012. They invited the 
participation  of  Croatian  NGOs  and  state  officials,  such  as  Ivo  Josipović.  The  key  NGOs 
involved were: Documenta, the Citizen Committee for Human Rights, and the Centre for 
Peace,  Nonviolence  and  Human  Rights.  The  round  table  dealt  with  discussing  how  war 
crimes  were  handled  in  terms  of  managing  their  sentences,  which  in  Croatia’s  case  has 
involved a reduction policy. Temida
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According to the groups, and their civilian supporters, the law would continue 
to locally blanket the crimes by stating in the Impunity laws that the crimes 
were security measures protecting Croatia (Pilsel, 2011). The protests and 
public outcry capture the anxiety of the people in terms of feeling that the 
laws would allow the government to pursue, and reignite a culture of denial 
where many victims would be ignored again.
Managing the feelings of defeat
The second sense of political anxiety16manifests through the state need 
to manage people’s feeling that the national political agenda was defeated. 
This level of defeat refers to freezing the continuance of political regime 
and creating consensus for the new order or new politics where new 
governments concentrate on abiding by international justice frameworks 
and  EU  Integration  criteria  (Peskin,  Boduszynski,  2011).  Jelena  Subotić 
suggests that this is one of the many paradoxes of international justice 
compliance, which draws domestic tension among segments of society:
“…compliance with international justice creates domestic political backlash 
as it is unpopular with segments of society that supported past policies, and it 
can even lead to political instability as old-regime loyalists mobilize against the 
transitional government out of fear of prosecution” (Subotić, 2009: 364).
Locally, when looking at the societal level, I claim that international 
compliance is experienced as a state system built in the name of recognising 
‘a Hague idea of victim’ and responsibility, which has caused for major system 
shift where locals do not identify with the new imaginary that has emerged 
from such dense international management. This leads to the question ‘what 
is justice to me?’ For this I draw on the example of Urban Movement Mostar 
16  Political anxiety is different from political pressure is it captures the sensibility of governance 
– rather than political pressure in terms of procedural lobbying – it is more the impulse of 
politics or the way the state reaction – denoting the emotional aspect to politics – where 
discussions are made from a body of tensions and social legacies requiring management 
and address. Political pressure is more the institutional pressure. The policy pressures that 
leave  no  options  but  compliance  thereby  a  politics  of  compliance.  The  political  anxiety 
is  the  internally  informed  reactions  –  they  are  the  memory  and  stress  of  the  people  in 
the  government  –  making  decisions  with  anxious  responses.  Does  not  denote  a  lack  of 
rationality. Michelle Veljanovska
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(1995 – 2005). The organisation tried to use art to express local social issues and 
respond to tensions that have emerged from the mass victimizations during 
the war. They tried to point out what it felt like to live in such a context of 
defeat in terms of disagreeing with the past nationalist regime that took their 
pre-war existence and norms, as well as within a new order that struggles to 
manage social divisions. One of their numerous actions was a radio program 
called “Walking down the Victims of Democracy Street.”
The other more popularised action involved creating a monument of 
Bruce Lee (as a carrier of justice). The construction of the statute was used 
to express feelings of the people who were exhausted by a sense of justice 
that did not match theirs and want for the new state identity to be craved 
by Bosnians for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their activities resonate a strong 
voice of resistance toward a new order in terms of building their own sense of 
justice. 
The project came from a broader reform project, Bauhaus “Mostar 2007,” 
that looked at establishing urban normality through a European vision. A 
common trend since the establishment of ICTY, and the Dayton Accords, was 
international organisations aiding the establishment of particular rule of law 
ideology like anti-nationalist consensus (Subotić, 2009: 369). The Bauhaus 
Action plan for Mostar is an example of this. The project was inspired by the 
local tension regarding ideological constraints that emerged from the post-
war interventions. The Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau foundation, which provided 
support for the actions, noted in their project report how the local issues of 
injustice are a strong factor in the local transformation process:
“the project focused on the city of Mostar in order to activate spaces and to 
raise public awareness of the absurdity of the situation by addressing both the 
locals and the internationals… art may take on a special role, as it allows a fresh 
view free of ideological constraints.” 
Under these terms, the Urban Mostar Movement took the opportunity 
to demonstrate the strain of having to digest international understanding 
of justice in their Bosnia. This was echoed by one of the movement leaders 
Veselin Gatalo, when he explained the decision to chose Bruce Lee as the 
monument subject: “far [enough] away from us that nobody can ask what he 
did during World War II” and “part of our idea of universal justice--that the good 
guys can win.” (Zatichik, 2006)Temida
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Other co-founder, Nino Raspudić, noted that Bruce Lee allowed them to 
express feelings of “deliberate rejection for “great narrations” that had spurred 
violence and deeply politicized even the minutia of everyday life in the region”.17
Feelings of accountability
The third type of feeling defeated for managing, resonating’ society as 
victim,’ is ‘feelings of accountability.’ This is connected to socially reproducing 
an idea of responsibility, which has predominately had a legal frame. In the 
NGO community, it manifests in their projects when interpreted, or explored 
in terms of ‘feeling responsibility,’ raising questions like who is responsible and 
for what as a way to come to terms with the present systems in international 
judicial environment. This seems to be a central theme in NGO projects 
engaging with victims and veterans, and policy formation via advocacy of 
individual  to  societal  needs.  They  concentrate  aspects  of  their  work  on 
including self-reflection as a starting point to establish their programs. I draw 
on the work of Viktimološko Društvo Srbije (VDS) which developed their Third 
Way program with the aim for dealing with reconciliation in Serbia. As part 
of the program they explored and sought to produce approaches for dealing 
with the past by focusing on understanding the self (Nikolić-Ristanović, 
2004; 2010). The Third Way program dealt with the idea of individual and 
social responsibility as partially influenced by the broader politics of trials; 
international and local obligations. They looked at types of feeling victim 
ranging from being victims of circumstances to victims directly affected by 
the political violence of the past conflict. They developed a ‘non-accusatory 
model, as way for distilling an inclusive environment for individuals to face the 
past. They worked with the objective to indiscriminately allow participants 
in projects to explore their individual experiences of the war and post-war: 
“The method used, which included exploring, „trying“ and „exersising“ inclusive 
approach” (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2010). 
This work took the ‘responsibility’ question into an individual experience 
and implicitly explored the idea of responsibility framed by Transitional Justice 
principles. Ultimately, the approach involved the intersecting of Transitional 
Justice ideas into Third Way. Through its holistic approach and intersection of 
TJ, VDS address the question of responsibility in social terms:
17  http://memoryandjustice.org/article/discussion-of-mostars-bruce-lee-statue/Michelle Veljanovska
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The approach that intersects with the third way as well is “transitional justice.“ 
Transitional justice in general is concerned how „states in transition from war to 
peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy address their particular legacies of 
mass abuse“. It is „multidisciplinary field of study and practice that encompasses 
aspects of law, policy, ethics and social science“ (Freeman 2006: 4 in Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 2010). Similarly as majority of members of ZAIP, leading scholars in 
the field of transitional justice see punitive justice as a necessary element in the 
overall process toward reconciliation, at the same time recognising that other 
ways of dealing with past are also important (Minow 1998; Huyse 2003a  in 
Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2010).
Responsibility in social terms
The responsibility issue is also connected to accounting for the dead 
victims who live18 in investigation processes (Verdery, 2000). This is where 
‘responsibility’ obligates the people and the state to face anxieties of 
families, and victims in terms of finding those deemed ‘missing.’ This leads 
to responsibility for the bodies through the process of identification.
Forensic findings 
In subsequent years to the ‘end’ of the conflict there has been increased 
m o m e n t u m  f o r  r e c o v e r i n g  f o r e n s i c  f a c t s  w h e r e  p a rt i c u l a r  p r o c e s s  w e r e  
developed around forensic identification, confirmation (as a confirmation of 
crime) and recording of human remains. Such processes were set off by the 
‘pressures’ for proving the wrong doing, and proof of addressing the nature 
of the political violence. Forensic truth seeking was initially accepted through 
18  In her work “The Political Lives of Dead Bodies,” Katherine Verdery explores post-socialist 
politics through the symbolic interpretation of dead public figures portrayed as social and 
political luminaries. She discusses how post-socialist politics across Eastern Europe deal with 
the past by giving such dead and their bones political life. Therein she suggests that a norm 
with post-socialist politics is to enliven ‘old bones and corpses’ of public figures through a 
re-orientating of the present. For more see: Verdery, 2000. I draw parallels with Verdery’s view 
to demonstrate how in the post-war TJ context of dealing with the past in terms of seeking 
the missing, and addressing the finding of bones. The dead and the missing are enlivened 
and permanently linked into the new political order through the anxiety of families and the 
communities these missing persons belonged to. They become the silent community and 
carriers of justice. Through their identification they make visible the surviving community 
and their needs as vulnerable citizens. Temida
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the Dayton Accords (ICMP: 2002) where the importance for identifying the 
mass body counts was noted (UN Case file no. IT-95-5/I8-T; March 2010). This 
was gradually translated into the legal judicial arena as a requirement and 
resource for building cases seeking to achieve accountability over the ‘bodies’ 
– or rather the dead and the crime.
Therein, to an extent, the need for finding evidence was set off with 
judicial proceedings requiring ‘facts’ to build cases. Such investigative 
process was not just about cases and finding evidence of crime; there 
is also the consequences of victimhood in terms of families seeking the 
whereabouts of their family members19 or finding the individuals who went 
missing (Mašić, 2004). For instance, local Bosnia and Herzegovina group 
Udruzenje Prijedorčanki Izvor (the Source) was established to help victims 
and their families with regard to missing persons, internally displaced 
persons, and lobbying for improving the status of victims and the dead 
through  domestic  systems.  One  of  its  predominate  ongoing  projects 
is finding the bones of family members, and support for involvement in 
Court proceedings. Izvor set up the Court support network project with 
the support of the Norwegian government. The project works to develop 
a network for witnesses. The goal is to disseminate court support services 
throughout the whole region.20
In keeping with the need to address matters related to the missing, 
Izvor a n n u a l l y  m a r k s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H u m a n  R i g h t s  D a y  w i t h  a  p e a c e f u l  
protest walking of streets in Prijedor as a symbolic gathering. One of the 
founders, Edin Ramulić, notes the walk is peaceful protest expresses the local 
displeasure, and need for assistance from domestic bodies with finding the 
bones of their loved ones:
“the families of victims faced with mere survival, because they still have not 
achieved on the basis of the civilian victims of war, and said to them, in the case of 
19  10th December 2011, the organization Izvor held the International Human Rights Day Protest 
march, which called for supporting - symbolic gathering of five minutes to 12.00 hours on 
the main square, where peaceful protest to express their displeasure, and requested that 
the relevant help be given to them for finding the bones of their loved ones. http://fotogiga.
com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=525%3Aprotestnasetnja&catid=34
%3Anajnovije
20  For more  on the Court support network project: IZVOR” – Izvor (The Source) see: http://
www.norveska.ba/ARKIV/Ongoing_Projects/IZVOR/Michelle Veljanovska
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Bosnia, the largest number of lives in this city…The missing are denied the right to 
life, the right to a dignified burial and right to identity” 
Therein  accountability  is  expressed  in  terms  of  accounting  for  their 
people. Once the social concern for the dead to be identified is achieved then 
survivors become visible in the new order as they rebuild their community 
from the foundations of accounting for their dead. The dead are not ancestors 
– rather they are the silent community members of a society whose civic 
participation is validated through the identification of the bodies as the 
identification of injustice.
Izvor has linked in with the DNA project of International Commission on 
Missing Persons (ICMP), which was set up G-7 in 1996 (ICMP: 2002). The ICMP 
project has helped with confirming not only who is victim (in their direct 
link to the political violence) but also meant that the bodies are (one by one) 
anxieties for the state to manage. From this a political impetus emerged, 
which  involved  locally  ensuring  the  representation  of  people  as  a  way 
for managing previous marginalization. This has lead to the establishment 
of particular government bodies to directly evidence that the people are 
accounted for in the new Bosnian state, such as the House of Representatives 
of Peoples. This body was recently involved with drafting a bill on sanctioning 
genocide denial, which was translated directly from the European Convention, 
and therein points to the implicit meeting of international obligations like 
addressing accountability. Eventually it became a draft law on amendments 
to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) Criminal Code, aiming to 
punish denial of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and other 
crimes punishable under international law. The enforcement of the law is to 
include a prison sentence of three months to three years.21
21  http://tacno.net/Novost.aspx?id=11017Temida
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Conclusions
The  reform  phase  of  state  building  through  accountability  and 
compliance  has  determined  different  internal  consequences  expressed 
in  response  to  particular  experiences  of  judicial  obligations.  In  such  an 
environment, local individual and political anxieties in the form of different 
types of ‘Political Defeat’ have shaped the social and political transformation 
of each society in an era of dense social and political management. This has 
meant that the management of feeling defeat has involved establishing 
particular systems; and managing social order in terms of censorship, denial, 
self-imposed resolutions, and containing of the past. 
In response, some NGOs take a role as medium between international 
Transitional Justice agenda and local field engagement (where they call up the 
conditions of local society when ‘exposing’ new post-war ‘wrong-doing’). This 
is evident with the recent increase in the establishment of projects framed 
by international experiences with managing victims, and truth investigation 
regionally such as The Coalition for RECOM (Regional Commission Tasked 
with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious 
Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
in the period from 1991-2001). Further to this role NGOs become a vehicle of 
exposure and challenge to reveal the link and relationship of individual to 
national to regional anxieties. These anxieties are the feelings of defeat; the 
feelings of denial; feelings of responsibility; and feelings of disconnection with 
the new regimes that are European Union focused. 
Such anxieties in turn frame the nature of new government policies, and 
activity as they try to negotiate social problems, which means managing 
the  local  feelings  of  defeat,  with  international  obligations.  The  state’s 
performance is one of contraction as the new governments need for adhering 
to the experiences of the people, as well as rehabilitating the image of the 
new state through fulfilment of judicial obligations. Ultimately producing 
responsive governance and politics. Therefore the new state is built on a bed 
of: ’Legal vs. social responsibility’ as an imposed guilt, pain, loss, or trauma, 
where everyone is a victim and everyone defeated in terms of new verses old 
imaginaries and hope.Michelle Veljanovska
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Mi ch el l e Ve l J a n o V s k a
Posledice­sudskih­obaveza­kao­politika­tranzicije­u­posleratnoj­
Srbiji,­Bosni­i­Hercegovini­i­Hrvatskoj
Ovaj rad bavi se pojmom žrtve od individualnog do društvenog nivoa u okviru 
konteksta tranzicione pravde i pomirenja. Pojmovi pravde i istine postali su u velikoj 
meri prisutni u posleratnim državama na Balkanu. Reforma države zahtevala je 
obnavljanje društva bazirano na specifičnim pravnim interpretacijama političkog 
nasilja. Kao rezultat toga, era pravosudnih obaveza je dovela do okvira vezanog za 
regeneraciju, reforme i rehabilitaciju društva. Zato se u radu razmatraju posledice 
ratne viktimizacije u pogledu lokalnih odgovora na to kako se prošlost „obrađuje” 
kroz institucije tranzicione pravde poput Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu 
Jugoslaviju (ICTY), i povezanih ad-hoc mehanizama, kao što su programi na terenu. 
Uspostavljanje takvih sudskih procesa pokrenuli su specifična pitanja kao što su: 
da li se društvo može posmatrati kao žrtva? Kako društvo može biti žrtva? Koristeći 
društveno-politički pristup, takva pitanja su razmatrana kroz paradigmu političkog 
poraza kako bi se otkrila specifična politička anksioznost koja obeležava nova 
društva i njihove politike. U ovom radu ideja o „državnoj anksioznosti“ i „političkom 
porazu“ koristi se kako bi se diskutovalo o tome šta je na lokalnom nivou nastalo 
zahvaljujući jednoj takvoj politici u tranziciji. 
Ključne reči: žrtve, transformacija, NVO, tranziciona pravda, pomirenje.